How old postmortems get read again
This is the last post in this series and it is about the part of postmortem practice that almost nobody builds, which is a shame because it is where the entire return sits.
Key takeaways
- Surface old incidents automatically when a new one starts.
- Match on the systems involved and the alert, not on the words in the write-up.
- The near miss is the cheapest possible incident to learn from and is rarely recorded.
- Count recurrences by contributing condition, not by incident.
- An annual read-through of the year’s incidents finds things no individual review did.
Surfacing at the right moment
- Compute
- App integration
- Machine learning
- Management
- Analytics
- Front-end & mobile
The declined action
When an incident recurs and the earlier postmortem contains an action that was declined as not worth doing, that is exactly the information the current responders need, and it is precisely what a well-run process would prefer not to display.
Showing it anyway is what makes the declining decision honest. A risk accepted with a stated reason is a defensible decision; the same risk accepted and then quietly hidden when it materialises is not.
Matching on structure, not words
Full text search over postmortems works badly, because the words describing an incident are written after the fact and vary enormously. Matching on which systems were involved and which alert fired is cruder and considerably more effective.
That requires the declaration to capture the systems, which is one field at the moment an incident opens. It is the smallest possible ask at the busiest possible time, which is why it is a picklist and not free text.
The near miss
- Compute
- Machine learning
- Management
- Analytics
- People
The barrier is that a near miss has no natural trigger for a review: nothing broke, nobody was paged for long, and writing it up feels like manufacturing work.
A short form — what nearly happened, what caught it, what would have happened if it had not — is ten minutes and produces most of the value of a full postmortem. Making it explicitly short is what gets it filled in.
Patterns across incidents
This is the argument for tagging contributing conditions with a controlled vocabulary rather than leaving them as prose. It is slightly more work per postmortem and it is the only way this chart exists.
Seven incidents in a year sharing one condition is a prioritisation argument that no individual review could have made, and it points at work that would have prevented seven incidents rather than one.
The annual read-through
Once a year, somebody reads all of the year’s postmortems in one sitting. It takes an afternoon, it is not enjoyable, and it reliably produces two or three findings that no individual review contained.
It is also the only realistic way to notice that the same three sentences appear in six documents, which is the strongest available signal about where to spend effort.
What this system does not do
It does not write the postmortem, it does not identify causes, and it does not decide which actions matter. Those are the parts that require somebody who understands what happened, and a generated write-up would be plausible, fluent, and would remove the thinking that is the entire point of the exercise.
What it does is capture what would otherwise be lost, keep the actions honest, and put the right old document in front of the right person at the right moment. That is enough.
Next: what all of this costs to run.
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